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Converging technologies and de-perimeterisation: towards risky active insulation 
 
In converging technologies (Roco and Bainbridge, 2003), boundaries between previously 
separated technologies become permeable. A similar process is also taking place within 
information technology. In what is called de-perimeterisation (Jericho Forum, 2005), the 
boundaries of the information infrastructures of organisations dissolve. Where previously a 
firewall was used to separate the untrusted outside from the trusted inside, outsourcing of 
information management and mobility of employees make it impossible to rely on such a 
clearly located security perimeter. In this paper, we ask the question to what extent these 
developments represent a similar underlying shift in design assumptions, and how this relates 
to risk management (cf. Perrow, 1999). We investigate this question from the perspective of 
the system theory of Niklas Luhmann (1979, 1988, 2005 [1993]).  
 
In order for technologies to function, they need to “decide” which influences they let in or 
out. This is what Luhmann calls causal insulation. We can distinguish between passive and 
active causal insulation. In passive insulation, the insulation is implicitly realised by 
“common” physical properties. In active insulation, a special mechanism is included in the 
design that is supposed to take care of the protection. A piece of paper is in principle not 
accessible, unless you have the paper in your hands (the so-called “air gap”). A file on the 
Internet is in principle accessible, unless it is actively protected (e.g. by encryption).  
 
As an example, consider the difference between barcodes and RFID (radio-frequency 
identification) chips on consumer products. The information in the former can not easily be 
captured from a distance, since the products mostly reside inside shopping carts and bags. By 
contrast, the information in RFID chips can be read, unless there are protective measures in 
place. This makes the security of the RFID information dependent on the adequacy of the 
security protection mechanism. Such differences also apply when boundaries fade with de-
perimeterisation and converging technologies: there is a shift from passive causal insulation to 
active causal insulation due to increased connectivity. 
 
Active protection, in contrast to passive protection, is by definition based on design decisions. 
This means that, in Luhmann’s terminology, the possibility of failure is always one of risk 
instead of danger: one could have made a different design decision, which is not the case with 
passive protection by physical separation of technologies. Moreover, how the protection 
works can no longer be understood without specialist knowledge. It is easier to convince the 
public that barcodes cannot be read from a distance than to achieve the same result for RFID, 
even when experts find the protection adequate. This means that trust becomes increasingly 
important. Instead of unconsciously relying on the physical separation of systems, we have to 
decide consciously whether we trust a security measure to protect our assets. 
 
Simultaneously, increased connectivity often amounts to a shift from causal insulation based 
on physical separation to causal insulation based on informational separation, called “non-
interference” in computing science (Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003). Whereas a traditional pill 
relies on chemical properties to release its contents, a digital pill may be steered from outside 
the body, requiring again active protection, which is typically based on informational 
properties rather than physical properties (e.g. authentication and encryption). 
 
When insulation is insufficient, as in the case of de-perimeterisation, an alternative or 
complementary approach is to detect when a technology is being misused. In information 
technology, this is called intrusion detection (Bolzoni and Etalle, 2008). Based on the 
similarity between de-perimeterisation and converging technologies, we predict that intrusion 
detection will increasingly be applied in to converging technologies as well, shifting the 
design assumptions from protection towards detection. When everything is connected in the 
information domain (Internet of things), lack of protection may lead to for example digital 
pills being “hacked”. In such a case, pills need to be suspicious about the instructions given to 
them: if they get a strange sequence of instructions, they may decide not to execute them and 
generate a warning instead. Moreover, this security mechanism will itself rely on information 
about the use of the device, which also needs to be protected. 
 
Concluding the argument, converging technologies and de-perimeterisation are similar in that 
both involve in their design assumptions the dissolution of boundaries, a shift from passive to 
active protection, and a shift from physical to informational insulation. This makes protection 
both more risky, in the sense of based on design choices, and more subject to specialist 
knowledge and therefore trust. Because of the shift towards informational insulation, the 
complementary use of insulation and intrusion detection in computing science will 
increasingly apply to converging technologies as well. 
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